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Introduction
President Carter's decision to "normalize" diplomatic relations with the
People's Republic of China (the PRC) in 1978 focuses anew the fascination
of the public, the press, and the business community on the vast potential of
the China trade. The Chinese themselves were also eager to utilize the cap-
ital and technology of American and Western firms for economic develop-
ment projects and for expansion of their international trade. By July of
1979, the Fifth National People's Congress had adopted a law governing
joint ventures in order to attract foreign capital, technology, and marketing
participation in PRC development projects under joint control of PRC state
enterprises. I
*Mr. Lee is a lawyer in New York City.
'For a survey of the literature on these developments, see, e.g., F.C. Rich, Joint Ventures in
China.- The Legal Challenge, 15 THE INT'L LAW. 183 (1981). Cf. also the discussions of N.T.
Wang, New Forms of Cooperation Between China and International Enterprises, 1 CHINA-
INT'L Bus. 11 (1981), and H.M. HOLTZMANN and W.S. SURREY, eds., A NEW LOOK AT LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA (New York: PLI, 1980).
Despite the sudden explosion of interest in this area, it had been by no means neglected in
the immediately preceding years. Dr. Oskar Weggel of the Institut for Asienkunde of the
University of Hamburg includes an extensive bibliography of the major earlier contributions
in his own work, 0. WEGGEL, DAS AUSSENHANDELSRECHT DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA (THE
FOREIGN TRADE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1976),
at pp. 479-82. Recent innovations such as the new joint venture law have also to be read
against the background and experience of Chinese trade negotiations and political ideology.
For this reader, Weggel's contribution is fundamental to a systematic approach to understand-
ing the conceptual framework of trade with the PRC and should not be overlooked in the
pressure to be current.
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Over the years there has been a recurring fascination in Western business
circles with tales of the legendary mineral riches and the almost untouched
market of the world's most populous country. For those embarking on
trade ventures in that part of the world for the first time, however, there is
another world of business and contract relationships to be explored. Some
who have rushed in too quickly-or relied on only their own wits and their
instant experts-have already been forced to repeat the lessons that many
their predecessors learned long ago.
Yet there is wealth of experience in trade with China and other Asian
countries, and countries with similar attitudes to law and business that can
and should be drawn upon to avoid these pitfalls. We should not forget too
soon that up to the present time, the U.S. trade with the PRC is only a
fraction of that of the U.S. with the Chinese on Taiwan. And the output of
foreign petroleum and minerals development companies in Southeast Asia
have constituted vital segments of the world's market in these natural
resources for over fifty years.
A number of studies of Third World countries' petroleum and minerals
development contracts since the termination of the great oil concessions in
the late 1950s have appeared in recent years. 2 If there was ever any doubt
that Third World contracts were consummated in an atmosphere quite dif-
ferent from the realm of contract as executed in countries where the West-
ern legal system has been well established-following the formal model of
offer, acceptance, and generally final written integration which can serve as
the basis of binding judicial decision in the event of subsequent dispute
over terms or performance-the studies reviewed below should provide
materials to further assess the theories of the "death of contract" school.
A standard contract provision generally employed in the PRC, for exam-
ple, calls for "friendly negotiation" as the basis of settlement of disputes.3
As long as the political circumstances surrounding the event have not
clouded the issue (as in the unfortunate results of cases which arose during
the "cultural revolution" or during other periods of strained international
relations4) the deliberations of the arbitration committees seem to have
been conducted in the effort to achieve a mutually acceptable reconcilia-
tion. To that extent the procedures employed by the arbitration committees
are fairly relaxed and informal, though the final agreement is reduced to a
new joint protocol.
'See generally DAVID N. SMITH and Louis T. WELLS, JR., NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD
MINERAL AGREEMENTS (Camb., Mass.: Ballinger, 1975) [hereinafter cited as SMITH/WELLS,
'75]; MALCOLM GILLIS, ed., TAXATION AND MINING: NONFUEL MINERALS IN BOLIVIA AND
OTHER COUNTRIES (Ballinger, 1978) [hereinafter cited as GILLIS, '78]; M. GILLIS and R.E.
BEALS, eds. TAX AND INVESTMENT POLICIES FOR HARD MINERALS: PUBLIC AND MULTINA-
TIONAL ENTERPRISES IN INDONESIA (Ballinger, 1980) [hereinafter GILLIS/BEALS, '801; M.
Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures before Foreign Courts, and H.W. Baade, Reply,
54 A.J.I.L. 305; 801 (1960).
3See discussion of standard contracts in WEGGEL, pp. 144ff.
'See discussion by Jerome Cohen in Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in ALEXANDER
ECKSTEIN, ed., CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY (New York: Praeger, 1971).
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Although Chinese accounts may be somewhat idealized, there is certainly
a lot of good sense in the attitude attributed to PRC trade representatives:
"... our aim is to settle the dispute in an amicable atmosphere and by
friendly means. You do not do business again with a partner who has sued
you in the court. Do you?" 5
The procedure doubtless sounds unusual to American businessmen, but
there appears to be a growing tendency also among leading American busi-
nesses which have equal financial ability to damage each other through
legal proceedings to choose mediational settlement or arbitration in much
the same manner. Unquestionably the ability to go into court-even more
than the ability to bear the financial and legal burden-is fundamental to
the willingness to settle in these cases. But the trend may be worthwhile
noting as a model. Professor Stewart Macaulay even calls for re-thinking of
our ideas about contract law-and its reform-on the basis of his findings
which establish this parallel both with Chinese procedure, and the exper-
iences of other socialist countries, where bringing fellow members of the
bureaucracy, or frequent business partners, into court can have adverse
effects on long-term relationships:
Studies in nations with different social and economic systems indicate that the
norms of contract law are seldom applied through the litigation process and that
disputes are avoided or settled where there is a long-term relationship between
the parties. Yet legal scholarship, as well as many proposals for reform, continue
to be based on a picture of the contracts lawsuit, to a great extent. It is likely that
this distortion is prompted by overgeneralization from a nonrepresentative sam-
ple of possible and actual disputes, and by indirect influence of legal norms; it
may also express the needs of legal scholars and reformers. It is questionable
whether capitalist, socialist, or mixed economic systems would benefit if more
disputes were resolved by the application of officially sanctioned contract norms. 6
Their experience in negotiation and formation of petroleum and hard
minerals development contracts in Indonesia since nationalization of the
great concessions presented the first multinationals with many of the terms
and conditions now suddenly part of the new vocabulary of those engaged
in discussion of joint ventures in China. That experience may also soon
serve in other areas of the Third World where these forms of business and
development had not spread before.
The common elements in the experience of the first multinational corpo-
rations in Indonesia and the new joint venture partners in China are: the
formation of contracts in a mixed traditional Asian business/semi-Western-
ized legal atmosphere stressing executive over judicial solutions; the foreign
'Id, p. 166.
6Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract,
LAW & SOCIETY (Winter, 1977); see also Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection
Laws: An Empirical Study, Working Paper 1979-1, Disputes Processing Research Program,
University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School, which deals further with the "conciliatory
rather than adversary roles" played by American lawyers at the present time. In all of the
above Macaulay seems to carry on in the spirit of G. GILLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT.
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developer/trading partner is made to appear to be carrying all the risk of
the joint undertaking, while the state enterprise presents more the character
of an arm of the government bureaucracy "administering" development of
the country's resources by contract rather than "engaging in a business ven-
ture" itself; production- or profit-sharing is employed as a means of pay-
ment for the foreign developer; and conciliatory rather than adversary
dispute settlement must be resorted to while the business relationship lasts
and contracts are subject to renegotiation.
This parallel experience does not mean that all those in the China trade
today will find themselves in exactly the same situation of the first multina-
tional corporations in Indonesia. What is described here is rather the
course of development in contract relationships, or, properly, transnational
contract law, in Southeast Asia over the past twenty years. For China today
is already prepared to talk in terms of "joint ventures" where the Indone-
sians until recently only have been willing to think in terms of "production-
sharing contracts" and "contracts of work." It is, therefore, not that the
terms will be precisely the same, it is rather that the outlook and ideology of
the contract partner have much in common that makes the Indonesian
experience of the first multinationals relevant to China and other Third
World countries.
Even among Asians, the Indonesians seem to have raised hard bargain-
ing to an art. And while many an ideological confession of faith is laid
down in the terms and concepts of individual contracts, these do not seem
to have presented insuperable barriers to avoidance in the course of ordi-
nary business practice: Title to minerals extracted must remain with the
sovereign power on its own soil, for example-title passing only at the point
of export. Title to the operations and equipment often remains with the
government as well. Nevertheless the foreign company affiliate must over-
come this formal legal obstacle in securing investment, obtaining insurance,
and in obtaining loan advances against this "collateral" as if it were the title
holder. The foreign contractor is required to incorporate a local affiliate
under Indonesian law and subject itself to Indonesian sovereignty and tax
jurisdiction. Yet, out of business necessity, the contract with the foreign
firm-until the Rio Tinto agreement of 1977-generally specified that New
York law would be the governing law of the contract, and that disputes
would be settled by arbitration. There is clearly no intention on the part of
either party that Indonesian law should set aside any principle established
by contract between the parties.
As conditions have changed, contract provisions have changed along
with them-depending upon the momentary bargaining power of the par-
ties. But the fact is that, for the period of its duration, the contract arrange-
ments between the multinational corporation and the Indonesian
government, or state owned monopoly, has become a kind of law unto
itself.
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The foreign contract partner in the Third World should, therefore, not be
deceived by such events as the media's enthusiasm for the development of
Chinese law, for example. For while there have been new statutes promul-
gated, there is otherwise very little "law" in that area. What the contract
partner should look for is a means of specifying all the terms of "law" and
their construction that he hopes to be governed by as terms of the particular
contract.
Here again the Indonesian experience of the first multinationals is rele-
vant but not exhaustive. Above all the Western contract partners in China
must realize that they are not all great multinationals. Their bargaining
power depends very much on the world market. But domestic, political and
economic situations of the Third World partners also have substantial and
immediate impact upon the process of contract negotiation and formation.
Again, the chief characteristic of the new Chinese "law" is that the bar-
gain's the thing. Both in formation of the original contract-and, if need
be, in resort to arbitration in dispute settlement, readiness to come to terms,
the spirit of conciliation, and bargaining power are important. Those who
omit terms they later expect to apply, or who do not take corrective action
when they see their venture partner has a different concept of the work, do
so at their own peril.
I. Background of Indonesian Minerals Development
A. Nationalization and Reopening- From Foreign
Investment to "Foreign Credit"
Between 1957 and 1965 foreign concessions in Indonesia were termi-
nated, and most foreign-owned enterprises were taken over by the govern-
ment. Mining was closed to foreign control. Yet, at the same time, new
foreign companies undertook new petroleum production and mining opera-
tions (and many old foreign operations took on new form), with foreign
ownership replaced by various kinds of contractual relationships. These
relationships have gone through a number of stages of development, corre-
sponding both to changes in the government and greater sophistication in
contract negotiation, which has in turn been facilitated by greater domi-
nance of the energy resource producing countries in the marketplace.
Following the nationalization of foreign holdings in the early 1960s, the
Indonesian government negotiated a number of new agreements, primarily
with Japanese firms. Under these agreements, "production-sharing" was
the "preferred form of foreign investment." In many cases the foreign com-
pany and management remained in place (as contractors for an Indonesian,
government firm), while ownership of land and capital equipment was
maintained by, or transferred to, the government. In fact, the foreign firm
often remained responsible for technical operations, management and/or
marketing. But, in theory, the foreign companies owned nothing. Instead,
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they were considered to be providing "redeemable fixed interest loans,"
plus service, to the Indonesian government.
Under arrangements such as these, the foreign investor was not to appear
either as an independent entrepreneur, or as a partner, or even a contractor.
Rather, he was to be conceived of as a creditor to whom a loan would be
repaid by the government within a stipulated time and in the form of an
agreed percentage of the production from the minerals development proj-
ect. Thus, in time, principal and interest on the "loan" was to be recovered,
and services compensated for, by assignment of a percentage of the annual
production valued at world prices. (See also Smith and Wells, 1975, at 49-
50 appendix this article.)
The kinds of contracts employed for petroleum production and for hard
minerals development were originally quite distinct from one another. In
part, as Smith and Wells suggest, this reflects the relative bargaining power
of the parties in the petroleum and hard minerals sectors.
A comparison of Indonesian oil and copper concession contracts negotiated in the
late 1960s tells one a great deal about the relative bargaining powers of the gov-
ernment vis A vis oil and copper investors in that period. In oil arrangements the
effective tax rate was around 65 percent; title to equipment imported by the com-
pany was vested in the government; and investors were restricted to production-
sharing agreements. In contrast, the tax rate for copper agreements began at 35
percent; the foreign firm held title to all equipment; and agreements had most of
the characteristics of very traditional concession agreements.
On the other hand, the terminology employed in the contracts of both
sectors was similar, though it might have quite different effect. Smith and
Wells tell us, for example, that in the early 1960s there were "a number of
'work contracts' for the exploration and exploitation of oil." These were,
then, "essentially profit-sharing arrangements"; this result appears to have
come about because marketing was still in the hands of the foreign opera-
tor. At that time, profits were distributed after marketing. Today, the gov-
ernment oil company markets its own share of production. We are told,
however, that "the 'work contracts' for the development of hard minerals
are quite different from the ovroduction-sharing contracts' for the develop-
ment of oil" [emphasis added]. This was written with reference to contracts
in 1968 and 1969, however. 7 As will appear shortly, this distinction is dis-
appearing in "third generation" contracts.
7For a model of the earlier petroleum, "profit sharing," "work contracts," see, e.g., Contract
of Work between P.N. Pertambangan Minjak Nasional (Pertamina) and P. T. Stanvac Indonesia
(1963), in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 248 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Stan vac/lIndonesia]. This
model may be contrasted with both recent hard minerals development contracts employing the
same terminology, e.g.: "Contract of Work between the Republic of Indonesia and P.T. Ken-
necott Indonesia" (1969), for copper mining and current petroleum production contracts,
e.g.: Production-Sharing Contract between P.N. Pertamina and Phillips Petroleum Company,
(1968) in ROBERT FABRIKANT, OIL DISCOVERY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA, where it is also discussed more fully--cf. Petroleum Legislation q.v. Biblio. V. infra. For
further discussion of the latter form of agreements, see Joyce Gibson, Production Sharing, 3: 4
BULL. OF INDONESIAN ECON. STUDIES [hereinafter cited as BIES] 52; 75 (1966).
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Both petroleum production and hard minerals development contracts
have gone through several stages of development, and recent models appear
to reflect the same trends. This works to our advantage in the study of
recent Indonesian hard minerals contracts insofar as petroleum production
contracts have been more thoroughly studied and, therefore, are more read-
ily available from different sources than are hard minerals development
contracts.
Thus, Gillis now refers to "typical second generation oil agreements"
(Gillis, at 124, see appendix this article), employing terminology from a line
of development taken by hard minerals contracts for oil. And the I.R.S.
rulings of April, 7 and 14, 1976, rendered on the question of the creditabil-
ity to U.S. taxes of tax payments due foreign governments on petroleum
production-sharing contracts (especially as the issue was raised by Mobil
Oil Indonesia), have become a central focus in the development of the so-
called "third generation" of hard minerals contracts. (See Gillis, 1978, at
125 and Gillis and Beals, 1980, at ch. 4, appendix this article).
B. Production-Sharing: Basis of the New Theory of Foreign Investment
As outlined above, the theory of foreign economic relations adopted by
the Indonesian government in the early 1960s rejected the previously
accepted form of foreign investment, and put in its place a system of "cred-
its on the basis of production-sharing." The principles of this new relation-
ship were summarized in official statements in 1962, 1963 and 1964, then
radically altered in 1965. Essentially, these statements first articulate offi-
cial persuasion on economic theory, then substitute a way of doing business
in terms of "foreign capital. . . in the form of loans but not of equity" and
"repayment in the form of an agreed share of the goods resulting from the
credit" (Presidential Statement of August 1962, see Gibson, at 53, appendix
this article).
in response to foreign business inquiries, principles and rules were rear-
ticulated in a series of official statements in 1963 and 1964. Very briefly
these indicate that "production-sharing" is an association of a foreign credi-
tor and Indonesian investor on a domestic project. Repayment on the basis
of principal, interest and possibly "remuneration" for services is made from
a percentage share of annual production valued at world prices or from
foreign exchange earned. While all such "loans" were to be guaranteed, the
nature of that guaranty would be considered from case to case and would
"not be given automatically by the Bank of Indonesia." Beyond this there
were a number of other provisions "which 'normally,' 'as a rule,' 'if neces-
sary,' 'in general,' or 'usually' are included" (Gibson at 55).
In an official announcement in January 1965, further concessions to
world business conditions were made, doubtless reflecting the current per-
ceptions of the declining regime toward their economic situation. Accord-
ing to these, attention would be given to "the conditions and regulations in
the country providing the credit" in fixing terms of repayment. Repayment
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would not have to be made from the product of the project concerned. The
foreign creditor might participate in management "for a specific period."
By implication, the foreign "creditor" might market traditional exports as
well as new products. And, finally, foreign participation would not be lim-
ited in time. An elaborate machinery was set up to review and implement
such agreements in those years, and a sizable number of projects were
undertaken, especially with the Japanese.
As noted below in reference to many paradoxes in the Indonesian busi-
ness world, despite these new approaches to foreign investors, the law guar-
antying foreign investments was repealed in May 1965. The "New Order"
administration, which replaced the Sukarno government, also in 1965, had,
however, taken a new interest in, and a more vigorous attitude toward,
attracting foreign investment. Yet, the system of contract relationships
remains the way it was redesigned under the Sukarno theory of economics.
In this system, the foreign company, which seeks to explore for and
develop petroleum resources in Indonesia, must, for example, first create a
new corporate entity under Indonesian law and enter a contract with
Pertamina, the state owned oil company. Contracts must conform to the
standard terms foreseen in Law 44 of 1960 on oil and natural gas. Under
these terms, the contractor assumes all risk.8 If oil is found, the contractor
may receive up to a maximum of 40 percent (cf. II.C.) of the value of the
crude oil and/or natural gas produced to meet exploration, development
and operating expenditures. Of the remaining 60 percent plus, 65 percent
goes to Pertamina and 35 percent to the foreign company. When produc-
tion reaches set higher levels, the Pertamina percentage/share is increased
on a sliding scale.
This model appears to hold for exploration and development efforts in
other sectors as well. The agreement on production-sharing does not
exhaust all matters of contract concern, however. The new corporate entity
founded in Indonesia by the foreign company is subject to corporate
income tax, and royalties also may be required on production volume.
These, and other matters such as land rent and import and export duties,
remain to be fixed in the general contract negotiations.
C. The New Reopening and the MBA's Approach to
Asian Law and Business
Oil production continued under the auspices of the newly nationalized
firms during the Sukarno regime. But, "[i]nstability and economic
problems pervaded the whole economy during the early 1960s" (Gillis and
Beals, 1980, at 114). Consequently, the "New Order" regime of General
Suharto, which came to power in 1965, sought actively to attract foreign
'A. Hunter refers to one example which departs from this pattern. In an agreement with
Pexa Oil of Australia, Pertamina contributed 25% of exploration costs. In return, the produc-
tion-sharing ratio in favor of Pertamina rose to 75:25%. See 7 BIES 98 (1971), n.4.
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investment back to Indonesia in order to help finance their plans for the
rehabilitation of the economy.
The new Indonesian Foreign Investment Law, Law No. 1 of 1967, sym-
bolizes this effort. The law authorizes tax concessions and certain other
protections to approved foreign investors. And, with few exceptions, all
foreign investment is controlled by Law No. 1.9
Substantively, however, the new Law No. 1 of 1967 is not much different
from the Foreign Investment Law of 1958 enacted by Sukarno, which was
repealed on May 27, 1965, long after the takeover of most foreign holdings
by the state (see Manring, at 432, appendix this article). Yet, the Indone-
sian relationship to law and business is more complex than this apparent
conflict would suggest. Sukarno was taken with revolutionary rhetoric in
the later years of regime, and, as Manring summarizes, "independence of
the judicial system was seriously eroded and the role of lawyers criticized as
preventing the development of 'Hukum Revolusi' (Revolutionary Law)".
On the one hand, as von Mehren puts it, "if the picture painted by Mr. Lev
[on Indonesian law] is accurate and symptomatic-the values and purposes
of the legal order, as they emerged in the West, are either little understood
or little valued in Indonesia." But the picture of law and business in Indo-
nesia is also illuminated by an acute perception of self interest even if
drawn "in unrelieved terms of personal and political advantage."' 0
Thus, while the Indonesians could guaranty foreign investment and
nationalize foreign holdings at the same time (in the case of former Dutch
enterprises, without compensation),"I they could also evolve the new con-
cept for "the preferred form of foreign investment"-i.e., "production-shar-
ing"-at the same time they contemplated repeal of the law guarantying
foreign investments. ' 2
The Japanese, who have among "non-Western" societies come closest to
Western aspirations in adoption of Western legal order, also have preserved
their eye for the bargain in the Asian marketplace.' 3 Japanese firms were
'For an outline and summary of exclusions, priorities and formalities set forth in Law No. 1,
see Timothy Manring, Indonesia, in JOHN 0. HALEY, ed., CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF
DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN AND EAST ASIA (A.B.A., 1978). A more complete outline is con-
tained in INVESTMENT LAWS OF THE WORLD, Vol. IV, The Developing Nations (Dobbs Ferry,
N.Y., 1979). See also M. Kusumaatmadja, Mineral Resources Exploration and Exploitation and
the Law in the Southeast Asian Region.- Indonesia, in VIRGINIA S. CAMERON, ed., PRIVATE
INVESTMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN ASIAN AND SOUTH PACIFIC COUN-
TRIES (New York: Matthew Bender, 1974).
"See Daniel S. Lev, The Politics oJudicial Development in Indonesia, 7 CoMP. ST. IN SOC.
& HIST. 173 (1965) Comment, A.T. von Mehren at 200-01; see also The Lady and the Banyan
Tree. Civil Law Change in Indonesia, 14 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 282 (1965);. and Judicial Institu-
tions and Legal Culture in Indonesia, in CLAIRE HOLT, ed., CULTURE AND POLITICS IN INDO-
NESIA 246 (1972).
"See discussion of the recognition of nationalization in foreign courts by Domke and Baade
in 54 A.J.I.L. 305; 801 (1960).
"For discussion of "production-sharing" see Gibson in 3; 4 BIES 52; 75 (1966).
"Cf., e.g., VON MEHREN, ed. LAW IN JAPAN, 1963; and von Mehren in 71; 76 HARV. L. REV.
1468 (1958); 1170 (1963).
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conspicuously the pioneers in undertaking the new form of investment
agreement with the Indonesians: in oil (1960), and nickel and timber
(1961). From their experience, the new formal relationships and conceptual
structure of production-sharing emerged (see Gibson).
But it is really the experts from the Harvard Business School, Law
School, Institute for International Development, etc., who have raised the
instincts of the Asian marketplace to business science, judging by the lead-
ing studies on the development of Indonesian and Third World minerals
agreements. "Improving the bargaining position of the developing coun-
tries in their negotiations with foreign investors interested in access to natu-
ral resources," Smith and Wells tell us, for example, "was the original
intent of this book":
It was our original assumption that most developing countries, no matter how
long they have been in the natural resources business, need some help in dealing
with the foreign firm....
One gets the impression that they must have learned a little themselves
from the Indonesians, however. (Cf. Gillis and Beals, at XIXf.)
Today we probably all realize that profit margins of foreign investors
cannot grow to levels outrageously disproportionate to initial risk and
investment; and periodic contract renegotiation is a factor to be considered
in transnational agreements, when the original situation changes. Objective
science "useful to both sides" may sound a little disingenuous, however,
when it seems to institutionalize change:
The initial negotiation of the contract is merely one step in a process of unfolding
relationships. The contract itself may set off a chain of events that will alter the
ultimate shape of the relationship.
While protesting that nothing has changed "essentially" at all, as, for exam-
ple: "control need not be linked at all with ownership."
The experts recognize the dilemmas of managers in boardroom and
shareholders' meetings when it comes to investing in and insuring opera-
tions and equipment that they do not own. But they find this matter largely
"symbolic":
In other cases the problems facing the private managers considering innovative
arrangements have been real. They have worried about how to explain the new
structures to shareholders, how to set up insurance against expropriation and
other risks on assets they do not own, or how to raise loans on property to which
they do not have title. Usually, however, resistance from management seems to
have been based less on economic and legal grounds than on the symbolic mean-
ing of ownership.
They make a virtue of the political importance of the symbolic transfer of
ownership for the host country-and the substantial, though diminished,
profits of the contracting company:
The 1960s brought major innovations in the structure of mineral agreements.
Most important, the new structures have broken the tight link between owner-
ship, control, and financial risks and benefits that was inherent in the traditional
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concession. Arrangements have been negotiated that have repackaged these ele-
ments in ways not feasible under the old structures. Because ownership and con-
trol have become important political symbols in most developing countries, new
contractual forms have been created to allow greater freedom in allocating
ownership, control and financial risks and benefits in ways that satisfy both the
economic and new political imperatives.
Yet, despite these optimistic insights, they must concede that strength-and
security-in the third world minerals market is a function of attributes of
strength and power in the world market:
Where a foreign firm is considered important for its financial, technological, or
marketing contributions, the new structures permit the negotiation of agreements
that grant control and financial agreements reflecting the bargaining powers of
the parties.
For even the giants of the world petroleum and minerals markets that
bargaining power is sharply reduced when world energy, and perhaps min-
erals, markets are controlled by marketing monopolies and standardized
contract terms are imposed.
Still, here again the experts find a virtue in a necessity, which seems very
much to reflect "the bargaining powers of [one of) the parties." From the
defensible proposition that it is advantageous for the foreign company to
negotiate standard terms which allow it tax credits rather than tax deduc-
tions in the home country:
Tax credits are substantially more valuable than deductions: each dollar of for-
eign tax credit reduces the firm's home country income tax by a dollar, while each
dollar of deduction reduces the firm's home country tax base by a dollar and thus
reduces the tax liability by only a fraction of a dollar. . . (Gillis and Beals, 1980,
at 130).
Gillis and Beals go on to a defense of standardized terms in general:
The context in which the issue of contract form is considered here takes as
granted that a single standard form is desirable. Indeed, standardization is virtu-
ally essential in order to avoid heavy negotiating costs for both the government
and the multinational companies and to reduce administrative problems in efforts
to implement and monitor agreements of widely varying structure.
There is no question but that costs of attorneys' fees, in transnational con-
tract negotiations, are high on both sides. Standardization of some terms is
doubtless useful. But contract terms are to protect interests; and this
requires counsel. It is recourse not form which is the abiding concern of the
lawyers, if not the systems scientists.
These are, at any rate, the questions raised at the stage of development
we have reached in the "third generation" of Indonesian hard minerals con-
tracts. A closer look at the development of these "generations" of contracts
follows.
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1I. Three Generations of Hard Minerals Development Contracts
(1%5-Present)
The "New Order" administration of General Suharto, which replaced the
Sukarno government, recognized the decline in the economic situation in
the country and was prepared to go much further than the previous govern-
ment in its last days in 1965, in making concessions in the effort to attract
foreign investment back. This was a vital element of their revitalization
policy, both in order to help finance a rehabilitation of the economy and to
promote new benefits they planned to introduce.
Hoping both to overcome the reluctance of foreign mining companies to
invest in a country which had so recently nationalized foreign holdings, and
also to extract the greatest immediate return from contract negotiations, the
government adopted the strategy of offering favorable terms to the first
applicant, then demanding progressively harder terms from those prospects
that followed. Thus was born the "three generations" in hard minerals con-
tracts the authorities on Indonesian minerals development agreements
speak of. Actually, different authorities use the term "generations" of con-
tracts differently, both as to whether the term applies to hard minerals con-
tracts, only, and also as to what years are encompassed by each generation.
Here, however, the term "three generations" is applied as used by Gillis
and Beals, for hard minerals contracts, only, and starting with the Freeport
Sulphur Agreement (1967).
A. The "1st Generation" (1967)
The Indonesians drive a hard bargain, and the "1st generation" of new
hard minerals contracts covers only one agreement: that was made in 1967
with the Freeport Sulphur Company which was interested in extending
their operations into copper production. There was a large, known copper
deposit at Ertzberg in western New Guinea (Irian Jaya), but exploitation
would require building the entire infrastructure needed in a very remote
and largely inaccessible area. Small concessions on the part of the govern-
ment in this contract, therefore, brought considerable return.
The "contract of work" concept allowed the government to retain title to
the land and the ore until it was extracted. Actually, it has been practice in
production-sharing to turn over title only upon export. The company
received a tax holiday for the first three years after beginning of production.
During the next seven years, the company was to pay a reduced corporate
income tax of 35 percent, whereas the rate of 60 percent then applied. In
succeeding years, Freeport was to be taxed at the rate of 41.75 percent.
Actually, the general rate of corporate income tax was dropped from 60
percent to 45 percent in 1970, but existing mining contracts were not
affected. The company was to be free of other central government taxes
and royalties on copper and gold. However, during the years in which the
35 percent income tax rate applied, a special royalty of 5 percent of sales
value was to be levied, though this would be creditable against corporate
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income tax, thus serving as a hedge for the government against possible
failure of the company to realize profits. (See Gillis and Beals, at 115f.)
B. The "2nd Generation' (1968-71)
The Freeport Sulphur agreement offered the breakthrough the Indone-
sian government was waiting for. Many other contract offers followed, and
"[clonsistent with the government plan and strategy the agreements negoti-
ated with these 'second generation' firms were less favorable to foreign
investors. . ." (Gillis and Beals, at 116). From 1968 to 1972, fifteen foreign
firms signed "second generation" "contracts of work" for hard minerals
development. But, no more tax holidays were granted, and royalties, non-
creditable against U.S. corporate income tax, were reimposed. "The last
second generation contract was signed in 1971." And despite applications,
"no new contracts of work with foreign investors were signed until 1977."
Under these contracts, well-defined territories were granted for a "gen-
eral survey" to be conducted over a two-year period. The area assigned was
to be reduced by 25 percent after the first year and by at least 50 percent of
the original area at the end of the second year. From this time, the con-
tracting company had another three years for closer exploration. At the
conclusion of that period, another 50 percent of the remaining contract area
was to be relinquished-unless substantial outlays for exploration were to
continue in the area in question, in which case an extension of three years
was allowed. Upon completion of exploration, another twelve months was
allowed for a feasibility study before construction began on the project.
Once production actually began, the contract term extended for thirty
years.
During years of production, the foreign company was to be subject to
Indonesian corporate income tax. This would be reduced during the first
ten years of operation, and rates would differ according to three categories
of minerals. Subject to requirements, a tax credit of 8 percent was allowed
companies with an investment of over $75 million. Beyond corporate
income tax, the company was also subject to royalties based upon produc-
tion levels. "Second generation" contracts were exempted from export
duties. But high land rents were exacted on the contract area. These land
rents increased on a sliding scale during the course of the contract term as
the contract area was proportionately reduced. (See Gillis and Beals, 1980,
at 120-21.)
Gillis' and Beals', usage of "2nd generation" is restricted to hard miner-
als contracts. Yet, at the same time, "new style" agreements for petroleum
production and timber exploitation were also reached. And these, too,
show characteristics of the Indonesians new bargaining posture, although
the "production-sharing" contracts, for oil production, differ in form from
the "contracts of work" for hard minerals development.
The concept of "production-sharing" was preserved in the new oil pro-
duction contracts of the Suharto, "New Order" administration. But, Smith
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and Wells tell us, "The new production-sharing agreements bore only
superficial resemblance to the production-sharing agreements of the 1960-
65 period, or to traditional concession contracts." By early 1971, thirty-six
foreign companies had negotiated these new-style agreements with
Pertamina, the state oil company. These included: Shell, Compagnie Fran-
caise de petroles, Gulf, BP, and Mobil. 14
As noted above, the Smith and Wells book points out that: "In Indonesia
the 'work contracts' for the development of hard minerals are quite differ-
ent from the 'production-sharing contracts' for the development of oil."
For details, they refer us to a comparison of the Kennecott/Indonesia, 1969,
Contract of Work, and the Production-Sharing Contract Pertamina/Phillips
Petroleum, 1968. Among leading hard minerals contracts are also those
with Pacific Nickel, Alcoa, and Inco (cf. Gillis, at 134).
There are two key elements of the Pertamina/Phillips agreement distin-
guishing it from a simple service contract, as Smith/Wells describes
it: (1) "Phillips was entitled to recover, in the form of oil, operating costs up
to an amount equal to 40 percent per calendar year of crude oil produced,"
and (2) "of the balance of oil, Pertamina took 53 percent and Phillips
received 35 percent." Further, "[w]hile it was provided that 'Phillips should
be subject to the income tax law of the Republic of Indonesia and shall
comply with the requirements of such laws,' Pertamina undertook to pay
such taxes on behalf of Phillips" (Smith and Wells, at 50).
The distinctions between 'production-sharing" contracts for petroleum
production, and "contracts of work" for hard minerals, signed during
this period, are also enumerated by Kusumaatmadja,' 5 who con-
cludes: "Paradoxical as it may sound, the production-sharing contract [for
petroleum production] is. . . more truly a contract of work. . . with the
foreign company acting as a contractor, than is the [contract of work for
hard minerals] in which the contractor, although indirectly, does have
actual mining rights." He further distinguishes between the two forms of
contract as follows:
1. Under production sharing, the government (through Pertamina) retains
management and control over the resources. Under the work contract, both are
in the hands of the contractor.
2. Under production-sharing, the work program and budget are submitted to
Pertamina for approval annually. Most contracts of work for minerals do not
have this provision.
3. Under production-sharing, Pertamina, as holder of the authority to mine, is
responsible for taxes and levies. Under a contract of work, the contractor pays
land rent, royalties, taxes and other levies.
'For further discussion of the innovations in oil production contracts during this period, see
Alex Hunter, Oil Developments, 7 BIES 98 (1971). See also Fabrikant's analytical study of the
production-sharing contracts of the post-Sukarno period. Cf SMITH/WELLS, '75, p. 57, n.57.
"In Mineral Resources, Exploration and Exploitation, and the law in the Southeast Asian
Region. Indonesia, in VIRGINIA S. CAMERON, ed., PRIVATE INVESTMENTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN ASIAN AND SOUTH PACIFIC COUNTRIES (New York: Matthew
Bender, 1974), p. 418f.
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4. Under the production-sharing contract, the contractor takes title to his share
of crude oil at the point of export. Contract of work agreements have "no such
provision." In other words, the "contract of work" for hard minerals extraction
demonstrated the greater bargaining power and independence of developers in
this sector at that time.
C. The "3rd Generation"." (1977-Present)
According to Gillis and Beals, the Indonesian government decided in
1972 that they would offer less favorable terms on future hard minerals
contracts, but negotiations were allowed to slide until a new basic model
contract was developed. A major issue here was whether to follow the
"contract of work" or "production-sharing" contract model. The decision
in this matter came in 1976, and the first "third generation" contract was
signed with Rio Tinto in 1977.
But, Gillis and Beals believe other events also influenced the govern-
ment's thinking in developing the new contract model. Recent hard miner-
als contracts in other diverse areas of the third world had secured more
favorable terms to host countries than had previous agreements in Indone-
sia. Indonesia appeared to offer greater political stability than many other
areas of the world, at this time. Furthermore, the domestic economy had
improved significantly, so that the incentive the Suharto government had
originally felt for offering more favorable terms to foreign companies had
been reduced. The rise in world minerals' prices was also decisive, to the
extent that the Indonesian government made a sizable equity investment
itself in the Freeport project when that "first generation" contract was up
for renewal and revision in 1976. In addition to these reasons, Gillis/Beals
also refer to what they believe was an enhanced capability of the Indone-
sian bureaucracy to deal with complexities of mining, taxation, and negoti-
ation; and dissatisfaction with the perceived slow pace of training and
promotion of local people and development of domestic supply and
processing activities (at 122-24).
The decision on the nature of the future contract relationship came down
in Presidential Regulation 21 of 1976 (See Gillis and Beals, app. B).
In essence, this regulation dictates the standard terms which are to be a
part of future contracts in the hard minerals sector. The basic terms with
regard to taxation may be summarized as follows: (1) During the first ten
years of operation, a reduced rate of 35 percent corporate income tax is
allowed. Beyond that time, the prevailing rate of 45 percent will apply.
(2) A scheduled rate of royalties will apply. But Gillis and Beals have had
to construct their own table on the basis of rates quoted in the Rio Tinto
agreement. (See their Table 2-5, at 53.) (3) Though export duties are not
mentioned, they are expected to apply. Here, again, Gillis and Beals' table
assembles the rates given in the Rio Tinto agreement. (4) A property/
regional development tax (IPEDA), from which "second generation" con-
tracts were exempt, is now imposed. (5) Land rend schedules continue as
272 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
they were in the past. (6) Exemption from import duties and sales taxes are
granted for the first ten years of production on a specific list of items
required for company operations. This is a limitation on the extensive priv-
ileges allowed under the "second generation" contracts. (7) A withholding
tax of 10 percent is imposed on remissions abroad of interest, dividends,
and royalties. This is half of the prevailing rate. (8) Transfers of property as
subject to a stamp tax; "exemption may be granted from the tax on place-
ment of capital." (9) Sales and excise taxes and regional development levies
are also imposed. The Regulation also contains provisions relating to
depreciation allowances, loss carryovers, and foreign exchange controls.
(See Gillis and Beals, at 125-26.)
In general, the ambitions of the government reflected in the new Regula-
tion are to attempt to avoid separate negotiations with foreign firms and to
control as much as possible of the relationship with foreign firms by general
mining and tax legislation. (See Gillis and Beals, at 124ff.)
The effort at "Indonesianization" continues to be a prime concern in all
phases of operation: management, labor, supply, and equity ownership.
We may therefore look for increasing emphasis on these goals in future
contracts.
Concern with obtaining the full benefit of the profits derived from devel-
opment of Indonesian resources is reflected in the addition of a windfall
profits clause in new agreements. There is also a greater effort to close off
avenues of avoidance or evasion of Indonesian taxes. This leads to new
provisions governing definition of "affiliates," treatment of interest, and
deductibility of expenses.
There also have been efforts at avoidance and resolution of disputes by
attempting to remove ambiguities in provisions concerned with termina-
tion, arbitration, renegotiation, and taxes and levies due local branches of
government.
The Indonesian government has in all this chosen to continue the "con-
tract of work" as opposed to the "production-sharing" contract format to
govern their relationship with contractors in the hard minerals sector. Gil-
lis and Beals treat this decision as a kind of concession to the foreign min-
ing operators, since the corporate income tax levies under this form of
agreement are creditable against U.S. taxes and since this model is issued
despite the political objection that there is the appearance that the foreign
company has control over the minerals upon extraction.
Doubtless Gillis and Beals are correct that failure to allow conditions
which would provide for creditability of corporate income taxes against
home country taxes would in turn diminish the prospect for more favorable
terms from the contracting firm subject to higher or double taxation. But,
as they themselves point out, this hurdle has been overcome by recent "pro-
duction-sharing" contracts for petroleum. And the question of contractual
property rights in extracted ore is illusory, since the Indonesian constitution
controls in preserving the ultimate right to the state until export.
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Therefore, Gillis and Beals' earlier suggestion that the bargaining power
of the hard minerals developers had been greater than that of the petroleum
producers still seems applicable. The advantage that prevails in the hard
minerals sector is small, however, and these authors also recognize an
"essential equivalence of the two contract forms."
Our immediate concern is, therefore, has the double taxation problem
been alleviated. The "contract of work" format assigns the foreign firm the
role of contractor for the Indonesian government who must pay corporate
income tax on his profits-in addition to royalties and other taxes-and this
requires that his net income from operations in Indonesia be determined.
The U.S. Internal Revenue Service seems to have put the creditability of
taxes paid the Indonesian government under "production-sharing" arrange-
ments in doubt in 1976 and 1977. This problem was resolved in May of
1978 after long negotiations between the government of Indonesia and the
United States, and the parties involved and the I.R.S. 16 As a result, agree-
ment on terms and calculations that .allow for creditability of corporate
taxes paid in Indonesia has been achieved for both "contract of work" and
"production-sharing" contracts.
In 1974, Gillis and Beals tell us, the 60 percent of oil production which
had formerly been subject to "production-sharing" on the basis: 65 percent
to the government, 35 percent to the contractor, was reallocated on the basis
of 85:15 percent for all oil valued at more than $5 per barrel. In 1976, a
further change was made in the "production-sharing" model. This time
companies were no longer allowed to take up to 40 percent of production to
cover their costs, but were instead required to amortize costs over seven
years (for fields with a short projected life) and fourteen years (for fields
with long life). This was also to have the purpose of achieving a "true tax
on profits" (at 128-29). While the oil companies were thereby demonstrably
losing their bargaining power, they were presumably gaining at least with
respect to the creditability demands of the I.R.S.
Gillis and Beals list four major differences between the "contract of
work" and "production-sharing" forms of contract: (1) The government
option to take its share in cash or in share of production is basic to "produc-
tion-sharing" but is absent in the hard minerals "contract of work."
(2) Under "production-sharing" title to all equipment owned by the con-
tractor and landed in Indonesia passes to the government-owned company.
The authors tell us that for this reason there has been substantial leasing of
equipment in this sector. Under the hard minerals sector "contract of
work," title passes only on completion of the contract-which can be in
thirty years. (3) Differences had arisen over the issue of creditability of
Indonesian tax payments under "production-sharing" contracts. But, as
already explained, that problem now has been settled. In the process,
'See GILLIS/BEALS, '80, p. 130. See also news releases of the I.R.S. from April 7, 1976,
concerning Mobil Oil Indonesia, and July 14, 1976, defining the I.R.S. position cited in II.C.
below.
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American oil companies gained by being allowed to consolidate earnings
from all separate operations in Indonesia. But tax payments had to be
made in cash not in kind. (4) Finally, as previously discussed, there is the
politically sensitive question of title to the extracted ore in Indonesia which
arises under the hard minerals "contract of work."
Gillis and Beals concede that it is "an erroneous view" that net income
does not have to be determined in a "production-sharing" contract. In fact,
they maintain that in order to prevent overstatement of costs or understate-
ment of receipts, it is necessary to have a clear idea of net income. The two
forms of contract are therefore "essentially equivalent" in this respect. Fur-
thermore, adjustment of tax rate and royalty payments under the hard min-
erals "contracts of work" achieves again the "essentially equivalent" result
to changes in production shares.
D. Considerations with Regard to Indonesian Contracts
In the course of study of the above contracts, a number of questions arose
repeatedly:
Questions of Definition-"Income," "net income," "royalties," "control,"
"processed goods," "depreciation," "affiliate," "subsidiary," etc. are fre-
quently occurring terms whose definitions can result in different rights and
liabilities in the host and the home country. Harmonizing concepts
between host and home country is also important.
If any doubt arises about certainty of creditability of fees, taxes, or royal-
ties to be paid, it may be advisable to obtain a ruling in advance from the
appropriate national authority.
The language of the July 14, 1976 I.R.S. ruling on creditability of foreign
taxes gives a clear example of the active role that the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service has taken in transnational contracts. In this case, I.R.S. ruled that it
would allow credit on corporate income taxes paid a "foreign government
owning minerals extracted by U.S. taxpayers," providing such taxes were
calculated on the same basis as U.S. taxes, and royalty payments were "cal-
culated separately and independently," and were imposed.
Remitting Foreign Exchange-Because of Indonesia's strict control of for-
eign exchange, it may be advisable to finance the foreign affiliate in Indone-
sia through loans instead of direct equity investment, both in order to take
full advantage of the Bank of Indonesia guaranties offered in some con-
tracts, and because financing in this way also allows for payments on inter-
est and principal to be remitted before allocation of profits or shares.
"Production-sharing" prior to 1974 provided for a fixed allocation of a
maximum of 40 percent of annual production to cover "costs." Since we
have only recently obtained a copy of a hard minerals contract, it is not
clear how "contracts of work" in the hard minerals sector handle this situa-
tion. In any event, international practice allows for remission of payments
on indebtedness, though a problem may arise with remission beyond the
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fixed capital deposits the Indonesian government requires to be retained in
the national bank.
Indonesianization -The Indonesian government declares that along with
training and employment of local personnel for management and skilled
labor positions, local supply and equity sharing are announced goals.
Desirable as this may be as national policy, the cost of goods, services, and
equity obtained in this fashion should not exceed the costs when imported.
This, too, should be a subject of on-going "renegotiation."
Dispute Settlement-Since the contractor is obliged to form a corporation
under the laws of Indonesia, Indonesian law presumably governs the rela-
tionship. On the other hand, the contracts clearly intend disputes to be set-
tled by arbitration. The studies of the experts indicate, however, that
"renegotiation" should also be considered a constant feature of "Third
World" contracts. The final lesson to be drawn from their analysis seems to
be that it is "bargaining power" in the world market and mutual desirabil-
ity of the arrangement which binds the contracts of the multinational cor-
porations and sovereign states. This reasoning also leads to the conclusion
that here is the softly spoken answer of the experts to the question of why
the choice of the "contract of work" model for the "third generation" of
hard minerals contracts.
That these contracts and the negotiations surrounding them have
achieved a place as "law of the parties" outside "the law" is a perception
based upon how they have functioned over the course of development of a
series of agreements. But nothing seems to state the need for law of this
kind better than the rejoinder of one of the experts to the comment cited
above (in I.C. at n.5) that the "values and purposes of legal order" do not
have shared meaning to both parties:
Indonesia . . .has been engaged in a struggle . . . to create both a ruling elite
and an ideological consensus. Under these circumstances, how much meaning
can law have as a set of rules to which all must submit? . . . there has not as yet
been sufficient agreement on principles for a system of law to be devised which is
acceptable to all.
* . . the response of judges, prosecutors, and police to basic institutional issues
was not extraordinarily crass or cynical. . . .those issues which would now
rightly be considered as fundamental in our own society were not usually per-
ceived as such by those involved in the process of institutional change in
Indonesia.
' . . fundamental issues of law are also fundamental issues of politics, and here
there is no reason to assume that the experience of Europe and America is espe-
cially useful elsewhere.' 7
The present writer may be optimistic about the formation and growth of
contract law in China and Indonesia. Not because these countries are
learning new techniques of "improving the[irl bargaining position" by
learning to impose their laws where in the past they have "need[ed] some
'
7Daniel Lev, Rejoinder, 7 COMP. ST. IN Soc. & HIST. 202 (1965).
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help in dealing with the foreign firm." And certainly not because the writer
has any illusions about the interests which giant corporations pursue in con-
tract negotiation.
Optimism, if any, for contract as a "law of the parties" is based rather on
the conviction that whatever else it may mean "law" is constraint on the use
of power. There may not be the regularity that Western businessmen look
for in the contracts where all terms and conditions of performance and con-
struction must be negotiated, where disputes must go to arbitration or con-
ciliation, and the basic terms themselves are still subject to periodic
renegotiation. But the security that the participants are at least parties to
terms of their own making is already inducement for firms far less powerful
than the great multinationals to try their hand.
If "law" springs from constraint on power as well as the exercise of it,
there is time for still others to recognize that "law" of this kind is too attrac-
tive to be kept solely for the advantage of foreign corporations.
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